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In the wake of the death of Ian Tomlinson at the London G20 protests in 2009, Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary (HMIC) proposed a number of reforms 
aimed at making public order policing strategies more “human9rights compliant”. One 
of the most significant developments has been the introduction of Protest Liaison 
Officers (PLOs) whose role is to build links between police and protesters through the 
establishment of dialogue and relationships based on trust. These developments have 
led to a burgeoning scholarship in public order policing in recent years. Whilst some 
studies have documented the development of ‘dialogue policing’ strategies, none have 
yet captured the complex interplay between these practices and the more overt forms of 
coercion and control experienced by protesters. In this paper we begin to fill this 
lacuna. Drawing on unique data on the experiences of anti9fracking protesters 9 a hard 
to reach group whose narrative has not been presented in the academic literature to date 
9 we contrast official accounts with the material conditions faced by protesters. 
Focusing on protesters’ experiences of both dialogue policing and mass arrest, we find 
little evidence of the progressive ‘shift’ reflected in official public order policing 
discourses. Rather, we argue that dialogue policing can have a legitimising function, 
enabling the police to define protest groups as irrational and ‘uncooperative’ and 
therefore ripe for violent policing. 

: protest, public order policing, dialogue, fracking 
Public order policing in the United Kingdom (UK) is undergoing a prolonged period of crisis. 
The death of Ian Tomlinson, a forty9seven9year9old newspaper vendor, at the London G20 
protests in 2009 (IPCC 2012), forced into the public spotlight what protesters had long 
described as a shift towards an increasingly authoritarian style of policing in Britain (Gilmore 
2010). The use of forceful policing tactics against student protesters during the anti9tuition 
fee protests of 2010 triggered widespread condemnation (Townsend 2010). Ongoing 
revelations that undercover police officers have been used to spy on political activists, in 
some cases forming sexual relationships with women who were deceived as to their true 
identities, have triggered a haemorrhaging of public confidence in public order policing 
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(Evans and Lewis 2013). The British police’s handling of protest has also prompted 
condemnation from the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of 
Assembly and Association, who has made a series of visits to the UK and some scathing 
criticisms of current policy (see, for example, Kiai 2013). As Deborah Glass (2010, p. 160), 
former Deputy Commissioner of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) 
acknowledged in 2010, “The British police have taken a bit of a battering … over their 
handling of public protest”. 
The official response to the renewed crisis of legitimacy in public order policing has 
been a plethora of official inquiries and reports tasked with investigating the legitimacy of 
existing public order policing methods and the associated mechanisms of police 
accountability (HMIC 2009a, 2009b, HCHAC 2009, JCHR 2009). Arguably the most 
significant is a two9part report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), 
published in the wake of the London G20 protests (HMIC 2009a, 2009b). One of the report’s 
central recommendations is that enhanced dialogue between police and protesters is essential 
in order to ensure a “proportionate” policing response (HMIC 2009a, p. 10). Drawing on an 
earlier report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), which had called for a policy 
of ‘no surprises’ in the policing of protest, the Inspectorate concludes that:  
Protest will be inherently more difficult to plan and facilitate where there is no 
constructive dialogue between the police and protesters. This may result in the use of 
police tactics which are more restrictive than would otherwise be the case (HMIC, 
2009a: 9).  
These recommendations have led to a number of policy reforms aimed at making 
public order policing strategies more “human9rights compliant” (HMIC 2009b, p. 121). One 
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of the most notable developments is the introduction of Protest Liaison Officers (PLOs) 
whose role is to build links between police, protest organisers and protesters through the 
establishment of dialogue and relationships based on trust (College of Policing 2014).The 
emphasis on ‘dialogue’ is underpinned by an understanding, on behalf of the police, that “if 
protesters share their intentions with us beforehand, this enables us to put the right measures 
in place to facilitate a safe environment for groups and provide a proportionate policing 
presence” (Sussex Police 2013). The introduction of PLOs coincides with what has been 
identified in a number of recent academic studies as a move towards a more consensual style 
of protest policing which favours “cooperation and communication between police and 
protesters” in order to “reduce the likelihood of violence” (Gorringe and Rosie 2008, p. 189). 
This body of literature departs from what P.A.J. Waddington (1995, p. 1) has described as an 
“orthodoxy” in public order policing research, which has traditionally focused on its 
repressive and increasingly militaristic function (Bunyan 1977, Fine and Millar 1985, 
Jefferson 1990, Scraton 1985). In contrast a growing body of academic literature charts a 
progressive shift from an approach based on coercion to a more proactive, consent9based 
approach, which utilises techniques of ‘communication’, ‘dialogue’ and ‘negotiation’ 
(Gorringe and Rosie 2008, King and Waddington 2005, Gorringe . 2011, Reicher . 
2004). These analyses suggest that protest policing is becoming increasingly open and 
democratic, with the police actively seeking to de9escalate potentially confrontational 
situations through consensually negotiated solutions. Writing in the context of the United 
States, McPhail . (1998) describe this shift as a move from 	
 to 

. They suggest that the latter is characterised by a greater respect for protesters’ 
human rights, a more tolerant approach to community disruption, an increasingly 































































For Peer Review Only
5 
 
collaborative approach to protest organisers and a reduced tendency to make arrests and 
resort to the use of force (see also Noakes . 2005). Researchers have charted a similar 
trend across Europe, with public order policing styles becoming increasingly sensitive to the 
‘rights’ of protesters (della Porta and Reiter 1998, Waddington 1994).  
The formalisation of negotiated management principles in the wake of the London 
G20 protests has been welcomed by a growing body of academic writers in the area. 
McSeveny and Waddington (2011), for example, are positive about the use of PLOs. They 
argue that their deployment by South Yorkshire Police has improved the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of tactical operations. Gorringe . (2010, p. 17) are also optimistic about the 
benefits of improved dialogue between police and protesters, describing the initiatives as 
“some of the most progressive developments to the policing of public order in the UK since 
the 1980s”. Protest policing is said to be entering what HMIC (2011) has described as a “new 
era”, grounded on consent, mutual collaboration and an overarching respect for protesters’ 
human rights. Some studies have, however, noted difficulties in implementing dialogue 
policing strategies in relation to certain ‘types’ of protesters. Variously described as 
‘transgressive’ (Stott ., 2013: 7), ‘anti9systemic’ (Gorringe and Rosie 2008, p, 194), ‘hard 
core’ and ‘radical’ (Gorringe et al. 2012, p. 129), these groups are said to be characterised by 
an unwillingness to engage with police and involvement in ‘direct action’ forms of protest 
(Gorringe and Rosie 2013, p.7, Stott . 2013, p. 224). In such cases, this literature claims 
that attempts to engage in meaningful dialogue will often fail, leading the police to resort to 
more forceful methods, including mass arrest, ‘kettling’ and intrusive surveillance. These 
findings echo the conclusions made in the HMIC report that a failure to engage with police 
can result in the use of “more restrictive” policing tactics (HMIC, 2009a: 9). Nonetheless 
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despite some initial “‘teething’ problems” (Stott . 2013, p. 13), dialogue policing is said 
have the potential to “improve mutual understanding and reduce the potential for violence 
between police and protesters” (Gorringe and Rosie 2013, p. 7).  
Against the optimism reflected in much recent public order policing scholarship, the 
history of police reform in the UK should give us grounds for caution. As Loftus (2009) has 
observed, changes within operational policing 
 do not necessarily lead to changes in 
policing . Dialogue policing draws on a longer tradition of ‘community policing’ 
which developed in the context of a crisis of legitimacy in policing in the aftermath of the 
inner9city riots and industrial disputes of the 1980s. The community policing model 
emphasises communication and interpersonal skills over more physically direct aspects of 
law enforcement (Tilley 2003). In response to calls for greater accountability in policing, 
community policing was presented as a key means of improving community relations and 
eventually became a guiding philosophy amongst senior police officers (Reiner 2010). 
Writing in 1984, Gordon highlighted the realities of community policing as “a reactive 
attempt at disguised police surveillance and control” (Gordon 1984, p. 56). He argued that 
rather than offering an alternative to unwelcome police practices and strategies, the 
development of community policing reflected a recognition that “open control” in the form of 
overt coercion can be counterproductive. Community policing was thus a technique used to 
engineer consent for an intensification of repressive state practices, rather than a progressive 
response to widespread demands for greater public accountability in policing (Gordon 1984, 
p. 141). More recently, Bullock and Johnson’s (2012) research into the impact of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) on policing suggests that a growing awareness of human rights 
obligations among police officers does not necessarily translate into more democratic 
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policing practices. Drawing on data gathered from interviews with policing personnel, 
Bullock and Johnson found that although the HRA 1998 has led to a “new framework” 
through which police officers carry out their work, there is little evidence to suggest it has 
promoted greater respect for human rights amongst officers. In the words of one of the 
officers interviewed: “I don’t think anything has changed. It hasn’t made us question the way 
we operate. I haven’t seen any impact. I can’t think of any obvious difference in what we 
have done” (Bullock and Johnson 2012, pp. 14915).  
These experiences suggest that recent developments in public order policing warrant 
careful scrutiny. As Gorringe  (2012, p. 112) have noted, there has been very little 
“empirical ‘testing’” of the reforms within operational policing practice. It is essential that 
this analysis is grounded in the experiences of protesters. As others have suggested, the real 
test of human rights reforms are not to be found in official declarations, but in the material 
conditions that people face (Ewing, 2012, Costigan and Tomas 2005). There has to date been 
no comprehensive study of how protesters have experienced recent developments in public 
order policing policy. Very little is therefore known about  some protesters may be 
reluctant to engage with police and the ways in which these relationships influence the styles 
of policing that protesters experience. Whilst some studies have documented the development 
of dialogue policing strategies (Gorringe  2011, 2012; McSeveny and Waddington 
2011), none have yet captured the complex interplay between these practices and the more 
overt forms of coercion and control experienced by protesters. In this paper we begin to fill 
this lacuna. Drawing on an empirical case study of the experiences of anti9fracking protesters, 
we test the legitimacy of official claims that there has been a progressive shift in public order 
policing practice. Focusing on protesters’ experiences of both dialogue policing and mass 
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arrest, we suggest the dialogue model obscures the highly discretionary nature of public order 
policing and the substantial power imbalance between the police and protest groups. We 
suggest that rather than being a way of “protecting protesters’ … human rights” (McPhail and 
McCarthy 2005, p. 5), dialogue policing can have a  function, enabling the police 






This paper draws on data gathered from an ethnographic case9study of the policing of the 
Barton Moss Community Protection Camp (BMCPC) – an anti9fracking protest that took 
place in Salford, Greater Manchester between November 2013 and April 2014. One or more 
of the authors visited the camp on fifteen separate occasions to observe the protest and 
interact with protesters at the site. Interviews focusing on protesters’ experiences of policing 
were conducted with twenty9eight protesters, with each interview lasting between forty9five 
minutes and two hours.   
Existing public order policing scholarship has tended to limit the focus of analysis to 
isolated protest events (e.g. McSeveny and Waddington 2011, Gorringe . 2010, 2012). 
Our case study in contrast adopts a more holistic and longitudinal approach, examining how 
the protests developed from the planning stages in 2013 through to the conclusion of the 
criminal proceedings arising from the protests in 2016. This included monitoring the criminal 
justice response to the protests, observing over twenty hours of video footage collated by 
activists at the site, attending court hearings and defence campaign meetings and analysing 
legal case files. Additional data was gathered via requests under the Freedom of Information 
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Act 2000 (FOIA 2000) to several public bodies including Greater Manchester Police (GMP), 
the IPCC and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). This data was triangulated with other 
publicly available information, including GMP press statements, to ensure a rich and detailed 
analysis.  
Whilst the data is limited to a single case study, it has important implications for 
protest policing and directions for future research. The anti9fracking movement has been 
described as the UK’s “fastest growing social movement” (Short . 2015, p. 721) and the 
Network for Police Monitoring (Netpol 2014) has suggested that protest against fracking 
represents “the biggest test of public order policing” over the coming years. The issue is also 
of global significance, with concerns over the policing of anti9fracking protest reported in 
Canada, the US and Australia (Short  2015). Yet there is an absence of academic 
research into the policing of anti9fracking protest and the experiences of those involved. Our 
analysis is situated within a contextual framework that assumes that the experiences of those 
at the camp – those who were being policed at Barton Moss – are central to unlocking what 
happened during the protest. In contrast to much recent public order policing scholarship, we 
did not interview police officers as part of our research methodology. Our independence from 
police was essential in order for us to gain access to research participants and unlock 
experiences that have been absent from the academic literature to date. This was particularly 
important for those protesters who had some of the most negative experiences of policing, 
including women who reported the use of sexualised violence by officers at the site (Gilmore 
. 2016). Our unique access to camp residents and supporters has enabled us to move 
beyond official protest policing discourses and present a 	

 (Jefferson 1987), 
grounding our analysis in the experiences of the policed. 








































































‘Fracking’, or hydraulic fracturing, is the process of extracting shale gas from solid rock 
hundreds of metres to kilometres below the surface, by pumping water, sand and chemicals at 
high pressure into the rock. Technological advances in the last twenty9five years, driven by 
the merger of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques, have enabled the 
exploitation of previously inaccessible shale gas reserves. In the UK, significant shale 
deposits have been identified, and exploratory drilling to explore their potential has been 
actively encouraged by UK governments since 2007 (Short . 2015). Whilst a number of 
governments across Europe, including New Labour, Coalition and current Conservative 
governments in the UK, have embraced fracking, the development of new techniques for 
drilling have been controversial from the outset. Communities and environmental groups 
around the world have raised concerns about the immediate impact on local environments, 
including land, air and water pollution as well as the broader issue of maintaining a reliance 
on carbon intensive fossil fuels in the face of global climate change (Gross 2013). The first 
major protests against fracking in the UK came in the summer of 2013 at Balcombe, Sussex, 
where a coalition of local and national environmental campaigners established a protest camp 
at the exploratory drilling site run by energy company Cuadrilla (Netpol 2014). 
On the 17th June 2010, Salford Council voted to allow exploratory drilling for coal 
bed methane on Green Belt land at Barton Moss, Salford, despite local objections and 
concerns. With news that energy company IGas Energy would begin exploratory drilling at 
Barton Moss in mid9November 2013, concerned residents from the local area, and some from 
further afield, began to set up camp at the site. On Wednesday 27 November 2013, with the 
Barton Moss camp part established, the first anti9fracking protest took place in the form of a 
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community blockade that sought to prevent lorries entering the site. Over the period of 
protest, between November 2013 and April 2014, the camp gathered momentum and 
established itself as a community9led protection camp, sustained by local support and 
donations. The BMCPC was established as, and remained, a non9hierarchical unit with no 
formal leader or centre. It was built around a group of individuals with shared concerns who 
were free to act autonomously. Those involved adopted several protest techniques, including 
the use of ‘lock9ons’ and blockades
1
, but relied most heavily on ‘slow walking’ in front of 
IGas convoys in order to delay the drilling operation and to provide a visible and constant 
opposition to fracking in Salford. These slow walk protests took place twice daily, as the 
IGas lorries arrived and left the site, for four days per week, for the duration of the drilling 
operation. 
The policing operation at Barton Moss, conducted by GMP, was codenamed 
Operation Geraldton. It was planned prior to the start of drilling by IGas at the end of 
November 2013. In light of the protests at Balcombe in the summer of 2013, GMP had 
anticipated that there would be protests at Barton Moss as this site was identified as the next 
location in the UK for exploratory drilling. Operation Geraldton was a major policing 
operation that lasted for more than six months, cost in excess of £1.7 million and resulted in 
231 arrests (Gilmore. 2016).  
                                                
1 ‘Lock9ons’ and blockades are techniques used by protesters to make it difficult to remove them 
from their place of protest. Blockades tend to involve protesters linking arms and legs in a line 
or circle, whereas ‘lock9ons’ often involve the use of equipment such as bicycle locks, padlocks 
and chains. 






































































The policing response to the BMCPC provides a useful case study of the dialogue approach 
in practice. GMP prides itself on being a centre of excellence for the management of public 
disorder and has been at the forefront of the pilot training programme for PLOs (Gilmore 
 2016). In the public statements made during Operation Geraldton, Chief Constable Peter 
Fahy and other GMP spokespeople sought to make clear that they understood that the right to 
protest is a basic human right. The policing operation was presented by GMP as a balancing 
act with the police finding themselves “stuck in the middle”, whereby they were required to 
respect the protesters’ right to protest and IGas’ right to conduct the exploratory drilling for 
which it had been granted a licence: 
 
We have to be there to ensure the protest is peaceful and to balance the rights of the 
protesters and those wanting to carry out drilling on the site which are both lawful 
activities (Fahy 2014). 
For the duration of the Barton Moss protest, PLOs were a regular presence at the 
camp and were central to the attempts to establish dialogue between police and protesters. 
This dialogue, however, was not effectively established. For the duration of the camp, 
officers and protesters were not able to establish either meaningful communication or points 
of agreement about the management of daily marches. For GMP, this lack of dialogue was a 
result of an unwillingness on the part of protesters to elect an official spokesperson and a 
more general unwillingness to engage with the police. In evidence to the Police and Crime 
Commissioner for Greater Manchester, GMP suggested that dialogue had been attempted by 































































For Peer Review Only
13 
 
officers at Barton Moss but “some protesters acted in a cynical way and had no real desire to 
negotiate with police” (PCC Panel 2014, p. 17).  
GMP’s portrayal of the Barton Moss protesters closely resembles Stott .’s (2013, 
p. 7) definition of a ‘transgressive protest’: one that does not have “explicit hierarchies of 
leadership, formal membership, or organization” and is “naturally reticent to communicate 
with police about their intentions”. However, the experiences of the Barton Moss protesters 
suggest that this terminology is problematic and overlooks the significant power imbalance 
between the police and protest groups. In contrast we identify three factors underpinning the 
apparent breakdown in communication between police and protesters at the BMCPC. First, 
there was a widespread perception among protesters that GMP were not a neutral force in the 
ongoing conflict between the protesters and the fracking company. This perception stemmed 
partly from the way in which the policing operation was conducted by GMP. The planning 
for Operation Geraldton involved the production of a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) signed by GMP and other related parties, in advance of IGas beginning the drilling 
operation (GMP 2013). Alongside GMP, the parties who were signatories to the MOU 
included Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue, the North West Ambulance Service, and 
Salford City Council. In addition, the landowners Peel Holdings/Estates and the energy 
company, IGas, were included in this “expression of common interest”. Formally, the 
purpose of the MOU was to  
 
articulate the basis and general principles for ongoing cooperation, and coordination 
between the Parties in order to promote and contribute to the realisation of their mutual 
interests in relation to the delivery of the Gold Strategy (GMP 2013, p. 3). 
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The MOU demonstrates that IGas had insider access to Gold and Silver senior police 
command meetings, daily briefings or video conferences with GMP’s Silver Commander and 
shared police and local council information and intelligence. No similar invitation was 
extended to protesters. For many protesters, the close relationship between GMP and the 
fracking company brought into question the idea that the police sought to ‘balance’ the rights 
of protesters and IGas impartially, as the following quotation illustrates: 
The police communicated effectively with the council. The police communicated 
effectively with the bosses in IGas. To a certain degree, they communicated with the 
community, but lied to them. The group that were completely shut out of communication 
with the local constabulary was the protectors [protesters], and they were the ones who 
were on the ground. So every single day, when meetings were being held – that we knew 
were being held – we were completely excluded.  
(Alison, protester). 
As Jamie explains, this translated into a reluctance to engage with PLOs: 
we don’t see any point in liaising with them because we know that they do not have our 
interest as a priority. Their priority is to serve IGas’ interests or whatever the 
Government tells them. 
Second, GMP’s claims that protesters had ‘no real desire’ to negotiate with police is 
contestable. One of the key local campaign groups, Frack Free Greater Manchester, 
reportedly tried to play a liaison role at Barton Moss but GMP refused to meet with them 
(Gilmore . 2016). Moreover, interviewees cited several examples whereby attempts had 
been made to negotiate with police officers, but ‘deals’ had ultimately been broken. As Lee 
noted:   
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a Chief Inspector Del Boy came down here for a chat on a quiet Wednesday, and he 
basically wanted to make a deal with us. We did actually deal with him … he came down 
here and we bargained and he said, “Okay, 90 minutes, no arrests, no violence,” and 
we’ll still have our protest – 90 minutes. And the following day was that day when the 
pregnant lady got arrested, and [Mike] was sprung into a bush ... And that was in less 
than 90 minutes. So they broke their deal with us; they made a verbal contract with us 
that a peaceful protest would be facilitated of 90 minutes, and then they go and snatch a 
pregnant lady and throw a disabled man in a bush.  
In this example, attempts were made to enter into negotiations but the response of police 
suggested to protesters that a commitment to meaningful dialogue was not reciprocated. 
Experiences like this further exacerbated the lack of trust between protesters and police, as 
Lee explains below: 
They say they’re going to do one thing and then they do another. They’ve done that 
throughout now, we know they can't be trusted on anything they say.  
In most cases, protesters’ reluctance to engage with PLOs did not stem from a pre9
existing distrust or blanket unwillingness to engage with police officers, but from their 
concrete interactions with PLOs at the site. Michael, a public sector worker, was clear that he 
was ‘not anti police’ and works closely with police officers as part of his day9to9day 
employment. His interactions with the PLOs (‘blue bibs’) at Barton Moss, however, left him 
feeling frustrated: 
We didn't have a lot of engagement but when they did, you were just banging your head 
against a wall because if you reported anything to the blue bibs that you saw malpractice 
by other police officers, they either never saw it, or they didn't feel they could deal with it 
so you'd just think, “Well if you're there to liaise between us and the other police, then 
you're not really doing your job.” 
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These interactions led protesters to question the official characterisation of PLOs as a 
mechanism to help the police to ‘facilitate’ peaceful protest. Many protesters viewed PLOs as 
having a purely symbolic role, which did not influence the scale and intensity of the policing 
operation. Concerns ranged from a perception of PLOs as a futile tokenistic gesture, through 
to distrust and suspicion as to their overall function: 
They [PLOs] seem to mingle amongst protesters and try and be slightly like the ‘good 
cop’, try and be friendly. But then when it kicks off they disappear and they're not there. 
So I don’t really see the point of them, other than maybe to try and slightly change 
people’s perceptions of the police.  
(Sally, protester). 
Third, there was a widespread perception among protesters that the function of PLOs 
was predominantly to gather intelligence, rather than establish meaningful dialogue and 
negotiation. The following quotation captures these concerns: 
The only other role they are doing is information gathering. Recently, because the camp 
is obviously running down now, their questions are, “So what are you doing after this? 
Are you going to another camp or are you staying local, or are you getting a job or going 
home?” So, it’s just trying to find out our next steps really. 
(Sam, protester). 
This perception of PLOs as intelligence gatherers is not unique to Barton Moss (see, for 
example, Gorringe  2011) and the way in which PLOs have been utilised by other forces 
suggests these concerns may be well founded. Documents released following a FOIA 2000 
request to Sussex Police suggest that during the Balcombe anti9fracking protests, PLOs 
played “a pivotal role in the operation”by “interacting with the protest organisers”and as a 
result, provided intelligence on the escalation of the protest (Netpol 2014). As the Network 
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for Police Monitoring (Netpol, 2014) have noted, the report is critical of the way that 
this “was not utilised in an effective a manner as possible”and complains that it was unclear 
how PLOs fed back intelligence to their senior officers. Moreover, the Standard Operating 
Procedure for the Operational Deployment of Protester Liaison Teams (PLT’s) in the 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) explains that: 
Recent experience does tell us that PLT’s do gather accurate intelligence in the normal 
course of their duties. This is mainly because, pre and post event they are engaging with 
protest groups and do elicit information in the course of these duties which could be 
regarded as intelligence … Similarly, on the day of the event, the PLT's are likely to be 
working inside or around the group in question and, as a result, are likely to generate 
high9quality intelligence from the discussions they are having with group members  
(MPS 2013, p. 5). 
The ‘cynicism’ towards PLOs described by GMP should thus be understood in the 
context of the seemingly close relationship between the police and the fracking company, a 
failure to consult with protest groups in the planning stages, protesters’ experiences of failed 
attempts to negotiate with officers and a perception of PLOs as intelligence gatherers. Our 
analysis draws into question the observation by Stott  (2013, p. 225) that “in the UK, the 
police invariably start their planning from a position of negotiated management”. Whilst 
there was a rhetorical recognition of rights to free speech and peaceful assembly by GMP, 
this was not reflected in the experiences of those attempting to assert these rights. It is also 
questionable how voluntary these apparently consensual encounters really were in practice, 
given the imbalance of power between PLOs and protesters. Indeed, for many interviewees, 
the regular presence of PLOs at the camp was an unsettling and at times violating experience:  
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The protest liaison will pretend to be your friend, they use first9name terms, they pretend 
to be familiar with you. And they're getting paid to do all of this, all the while they just 
want to exploit vulnerable people that maybe it’s their first time of protest, and they 
don’t know how to protect their own privacy, their own security. And they just 
completely exploit that. Some would say they're worse than the Level One Public Order 
officers because, with a Level One Public Order officer, you know where you stand, and 




Despite GMP’s commitment to ‘dialogue’ and ‘facilitation’, Operation Geraldton consisted 
of two distinct and apparently irreconcilable styles of policing. One the one hand, the 
deployment of PLOs portrayed the more consensual style of public order policing located in 
official public order policing discourses. At the same time, protesters experienced the more 
familiar coercive styles of public order policing which damaged police legitimacy in the 
aftermath of the G20 protests. The strategy cited most frequently by protesters as 
undermining GMP’s commitment to human rights compliant policing was the mass arrest of 
protesters at the site. If PLOs were the ‘velvet glove’, mass arrest was the ‘iron fist’ of 
Operation Geraldton. In the second part of this paper we consider how the strategy of mass 
arrest was experienced by protesters, and the relationship between mass arrest and the more 
‘consensual’ styles of policing adopted by GMP.  
	
The strategy of mass arrest was a core component of Operation Geraldton. By the conclusion 
of the protest in April 2014, GMP had made 231 arrests for one or more of nineteen different 
offences (GMP 2015). The majority of arrests occurred during the policing of the daily ‘slow 
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walks’ 9 the principle disruptive activity taken by protesters to delay the convoy of trucks 
arriving at the site of the exploratory drilling. A frequent complaint from protesters was that 
the scale of arrest and the level of force used to make arrests was disproportionate to the 
peaceful nature of the action taken. Several interviewees cited the policing at Barton Moss as 
the most brutal that they had witnessed. Tom, who was arrested three times during the Barton 
Moss protests, described what happened during one of his arrests for wilful obstruction of the 
public highway – a non9imprisonable, summary offence for which he was later acquitted. His 
experiences were typical of many of those arrested at the site: 
He jumps on me from behind, immediately followed by, I guess, two or three other 
officers … one officer had each of my arms, and I was quite forcibly thrown into the 
fence face9first. And just quickly as I hit the fence, I had to turn my head to avoid injury. 
It was a real force; it was just totally over the top. As if I was a rioting individual. You 
know, it was completely out of the context of the situation. 
The focal point for many of the complaints was the force’s specialist public order 
unit, the Tactical Aid Unit (TAU), which was used with increased frequency as the protest 
developed. From the perspective of many protesters, the regular use of heavily equipped 
TAU officers undermined claims by GMP that the policing operation was concerned with 
dialogue and facilitation. Several interviewees described the stark contrast between the jovial 
approach of the PLOs and the aggressive treatment that protesters received from their 
colleagues in the TAU: 
But the TAU, the worst they do … they’ll pin you to the ground, they’ll punch you in the 
stomach, they’ll punch you in the head … there’s a massive, massive difference between 
the two styles of policing. 
(Jamie, protester) 
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In response to concerns about the intensity of the policing operation, GMP described the 
policing response as “proportionate” to the “emerging threat” posed by the camp (GMP 
2014). In doing so there was an attempt to impose meaning on the motivations of those 
protesting at the site. According to a GMP press release: 
[t]he majority of people who are arriving at the site are not there to protest against 
fracking but are there to disrupt and intimidate the local community and to antagonise 
police. We have seen offences of assaults, damage, harassment of residents and workers, 
a flare fired at the police helicopter and threats to kill.  
(GMP 2014). 
This portrayal of the protest as violent, and thus the policing response as proportionate, is 
contestable. Figures obtained under the FOIA 2000 indicate that 98 per cent of the 231 arrests 
under Operation Geraldton were for non9violent offences (GMP 2015).
2
 As indicated on 
, the largest category of arrests was for Obstruction of a Public Highway (77 arrests, 
33 per cent of total arrests). This was followed by Aggravated Trespass (68 arrests, 30 per 
cent of total arrests) and Breach of Conditions of Bail
3
 (31 arrests, 13 per cent of overall 
arrests). The stark contrast between the ‘peacefulness’ of the protest and the aggressive 
response from GMP had an increasingly destructive impact on the relationship between the 
police and protesters, as the following quotation illustrates:  
                                                
2 The offences in this category are: common assault (1 arrest), assaulting a police officer (2 arrests) 
and threats to kill (2 arrests). 
3 Breach of Conditions of Bail is not a criminal offence, but Section 7(3) of the Bail Act 1973 confers 
power upon a police officer to arrest a person if he has reasonable grounds for believing that that 
person is likely to break any of the conditions of his bail or has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that that person has broken any of those conditions. 
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why do you have to bring in the special other force to deal with what is essentially 
peaceful people – a lot of them elderly and children, people various ages and 
backgrounds, none of us violent, you know. There’s not been a single act of violence to 
another person committed on this camp so it’s a completely unjustifiable.  
(Maria, protester) 





A second complaint from protesters was that decisions about who to arrest appeared to be 
pre9planned and pre9emptive, rather than a genuine response to law breaking at the site. In 
keeping with this objective, targeted arrests were initially focussed on those members of the 
camp who were perceived by police not to be ‘local’. This action was considered by several 
protesters to be part of a narrative GMP wished to construct about the lack of local 
involvement in the camp, as the following quotation illustrates: 
what they wanted to try and portray in the media was that we travelled here because we 
are what they consider to be professional activists. So we were targeted, not from round 
here, we were targeted virtually straightaway … which is funny really, because I’ve met 
people who have been against the system for 40 years but I wouldn’t consider them to be 
professional activists. 
(Jack, protester). 
The perception of arrest as pre9emptive rather than reactive was reinforced by the apparently 
inconsistent ways in which powers of arrest were exercised at the site. During the first two 
months of the protests, most arrests in connection with stopping or slowing the trucks through 
the daily slow walks were for wilful obstruction of the public highway (Highways Act 1980, 
s. 137). GMP issued protesters with flyers informing them that Barton Moss Road was a 
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‘highway’ as it was ‘a public right of way’. Following a ruling by Manchester and Salford 
Magistrates’ Court that the land in question was a public footpath, rather than a highway, 
officers began to make arrests for the alternative offence of Aggravated Trespass (Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 68). This shift from one arrest power to another in the 
absence of a significant change in protesters’ behaviour fuelled speculation that arrest under 
Operation Geraldton was part of a broader mission to gather intelligence and disrupt and 
undermine the campaign: 
They’re arresting lots of people for aggravated trespass, but at the same time if they’re 
arresting one they should arrest everyone ... they specifically target people, so they 
actually do have a list of people they specifically want. 
(Lee, protester). 
Experiences elsewhere would suggest that these concerns may be well founded. Following 
the controversial arrest of 138 ‘UK Uncut’ anti9austerity protesters outside the Fortnum and 
Mason luxury goods store in March 2011, Lynn Owers, Assistant Commissioner to the 
Metropolitan Police, told the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee:  
the fact that we arrested as many people as we did is so important to us because that 
obviously gives us some really important intelligence opportunities … We do need to 
improve the intelligence picture, but our ability to arrest over 200 people at the weekend 
gives us a very good starting point in terms of building that picture (HCHAC 2011, Q12). 
The use of mass arrest in this context has corresponded with a significant expansion 
of intelligence gathering at protest sites, including the creation of a highly secretive national 
police database which holds information on individuals associated with ‘domestic 




































































 Although it is not possible to assess the extent to which arrest decisions at under 
Operation Geraldton were influenced by data included on the database, several of those 
arrested at Barton Moss recalled that police officers identified them by name prior to arrest: 
 the last week they keep on calling me by my name … a lot of the officers will, when 
you’re walking in front, directly in front of them, they’ll start saying that you’re pushing 
back on them and you’re a couple of inches away or something like that … some days, 
you feel like they want to arrest you so they’re making out reasons to.  
(Vicky, protester). 
For many interviewees, officers with apparently different roles at the BMCPC worked to the 
same ends and were essentially indistinguishable in terms of their overall function.  Several 
protesters described how PLOs and TAU officers appeared to work together to arrest those 
involved in the daily marches, as illustrated by Remy’s experience described below: 
I was marked for it [arrest] this morning. It was very, very obvious that there was a 
collusion between the police on the line, the TAU and the liaison officers that I was 
going to be snatched … suddenly from nowhere, walking at a steady pace, not doing any 
obstruction, suddenly it became ‘don’t push back on me’ … at the exact same time a 
liaison officer, who wasn’t close enough to be hearing that, came through the crowd with 
his earpiece and went ‘we are gonna have to tell you now that if you push back again 
you’re going to be arrested’. And it was very, very obvious that I had been marked for it. 
(Remy, protester). 
 
Remy’s experiences mirror many of those arrested at the BMCPC. From Remy’s perspective, 
there was nothing that he could have done in this situation to avoid arrest; he had been 
                                                








 [2015] UKSC 9, para 20, per Lord Sumption). 
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‘marked for it’ despite causing no obstruction to the officer in question. Like the majority of 
those arrested under Operation Geraldton, the charges against Remy were eventually 
dismissed. The pivotal role played by PLOs in what were eventually found to have been 




Despite a rhetorical commitment to ‘dialogue’ and ‘facilitation’ from GMP, from the 
perspective of many of our interviewees the central aim of the policing operation was to 
disrupt protesters’ attempts to protest peacefully against the activities of the energy company. 
Our analysis of the criminal justice response to the protest reinforces some of these concerns. 
The majority of arrestees were presented with a uniform list of pre9charge bail conditions
5
 
which prohibited their return to the protest site. Anyone returning to the camp following 
release from custody would risk further arrest. When challenged in the Magistrates’ Court, 
bail conditions were repeatedly found to be disproportionate and protesters were granted 
unconditional bail. Despite obvious concerns about their legality, restrictive bail conditions 
continued to be imposed by GMP. In some cases, attempts to challenge the legality of bail 
conditions were met with resistance by the police, as Vicky describes below: 
                                                
5 Amendments to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984) under the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 extended police bail powers to allow officers to attach conditions of bail prior 
to any decision to prosecute. These highly discretionary powers require that the officer regards 
the conditions as being ‘necessary’ to ensure, for example, that the person in question does not 
commit an offence while on bail (PACE 1984, s.47).  































































For Peer Review Only
25 
 
 when they give you your bail conditions you’re supposed to be able to say, “No,” 
and then stay in overnight and go to court, but they were refusing people to do that … 
First arrest I kept saying, “Can I talk to the solicitors?” and they kept saying, “Yes, we’ll 
ring later,” and they tried to bail me out the station before I talked to them and I refused. 
I said, “No, I want to talk a solicitor before I leave,” and they were just, like, “Oh, well, 
if they don’t answer now then you’ll have to go.”  
 Whilst bail conditions were removed within a matter of weeks, the criminal cases took much 
longer to conclude. Of the 231 arrests, 226 led to charges relating to 115 individuals (GMP 
2015).  illustrates the ‘conviction rate’ – the number of people convicted relative to 
the number charged with offences – within the criminal justice system as a whole and under 
Operation Geraldton. The conviction rate within the criminal justice system as a whole is 
eighty9three per cent. For public order offences this rises to ninety9six per cent (Ministry of 
Justice 2015). According to the data available to us
6
, the Barton Moss cases had a conviction 
rate of just thirty per cent. That is, of the 115 prosecuted protesters, only thirty9five were 
convicted of offences.  
 
Given the low conviction rates, arrest under Operation Geraldton did not appear to have been 
carried out with a view to securing convictions. Rather, mass arrest and blanket bail in effect 
served to create a 


 around the fracking site – an action that would 
otherwise have no basis in law and would be a clear violation of the protesters’ rights to 
freedom of assembly. Anna’s experiences illustrate how these exclusionary processes 
operated in practice. Anna was arrested for wilful obstruction of the highway and obstructing 
                                                
6 These figures were collated from media reports, court observations and liaison with defence 
solicitors. 
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a police officer. She described her arrest as ‘quite standard’. During a slow walk, she was 
pulled from the line by a police officer, fell to the ground and hit her head on the floor. Anna 
recalled that at the time of her arrest she was ‘doing nothing wrong … just walking slowly’. 
She was taken into custody at the police station where she was detained for around seven 
hours. On her release, Anna was handed a letter instructing her to attend at the Magistrates’ 
Court in two weeks’ time and a ‘standard’ list of bail conditions that prohibited her from 
returning to the protest site. The conditions were removed by the Magistrates’ Court at the 
subsequent hearing. Five months after Anna’s initial arrest, the day before she was due to 
stand trial, the charges against her were dismissed. For Anna, her experience of arrest 
reinforced her suspicions as to the ‘real reasons’ behind the mass arrest strategy:  
for us, we truly believed that the reason people were being arrested was simply to give 
them bail conditions excluding them from that area.  
(Anna, protester) 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
The experiences of the Barton Moss protesters are a stark illustration of Choongh’s 
(1998) distinction between “criminal cases”, where arrest and detention are used to invoke 
criminal justice sanctions, and “police cases”, where they are used to maintain police 
authority and reproduce social control (see also Hillyard and Gordon 1999). Our analysis 
suggests that mass arrest at the BMPC operated as a form of ‘summary punishment’ (Young 
2008), used to clear protesters from the site, gather intelligence on those taking part and 
legitimise the intensity of the policing operation. Following an often violent arrest, those 
pursued under Operation Geraldton were photographed, had their fingerprints and DNA 
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taken, were held in police cells for long periods of time and were subject to bail conditions 
which severely restricted their freedom of assembly. The time taken for cases to conclude, in 
some cases over two years after the initial arrest, has had a damaging impact on those 
affected. Several protesters reported problems with physical and mental health, financial 
instability and strained relationships with friends and family as a result of the criminal 
proceedings. The harmful experience of arrest went beyond those arrested. Protesters 
described the mass arrest strategy as having a brutalising and destabilising effect on the camp 
as a whole. Maria, who took part in the protests but was not herself arrested, made the 
following observations: 
Emotionally it is damaging over a long time. I have been here for four months. It is very 
hard, and the stress levels and anxiety levels in general I’ve noticed in myself are higher 
than normal, just being here, because of constant, constant violence, intimidation. You 
never know what’s going to be tomorrow, you never know how the police are going to 
be, which of your friends are going to get arrested, who’s going to get beaten up or hurt 
next; will it be you, will it be someone you care about? 
Stephanie, another camp resident, suggested that the strategy of mass arrest had an impact 
beyond those at the camp: 
They try to instil fear into people. Because another of what that causes, if anybody wants 
to come down, they’ll be like, “Oh, better not, I might get arrested, I might get 
assaulted”. And that’s another way that they can stop people coming and actually using 









































































The dialogue model assumes that protest policing is becoming increasingly open and 
democratic, with the police actively seeking to de9escalate potentially confrontational 
situations through consensually negotiated solutions. In the context of a crisis of legitimacy in 
public order policing, dialogue policing has emerged as a progressive alternative to the 
coercive and undemocratic policing practices of the past. In this paper we have suggested that 
this characterisation obscures the highly discretionary nature of public order policing and the 
substantial power imbalance between the police and protest groups. The Barton Moss 
protesters experienced both the ‘velvet glove’ and ‘iron fist’ of public order policing. 
Consensual (dialogue) and coercive (mass arrest) policing were mutually reinforcing 
strategies which, from the perspective of many of our interviewees, were essentially 
indistinguishable in their overall function. Michael, who was arrested and later acquitted of 
aggravated trespass at Barton Moss, cogently illustrates the ‘paradox’ between official claims 
of human rights compliant policing with the material conditions that protesters face: 
They look down at you, they didn’t treat you as an equal, and you can see an example of 
that on the [footage] where the sergeant is seen leaning over me pointing at me and 
shouting in quite an intimidating manner I’m liable to be arrested for aggravating 
peaceful protesting, when, just prior to that the inspector has said, “We recognise your 
right to protest and we will facilitate that”. It was kind of like, this was the paradox. You 
were allowed to protest, they would facilitate it, but if you do they would arrest you.  
Our analysis draws into question the assumption reflected in official public order 
policing discourses that dialogue policing is an inherently progressive development. Under 
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the dialogue model, protesters are expected to go much further than their legal requirements
7
 
by appointing official spokespeople and entering into ‘negotiations’ with police officers. In 
situations where protest groups refuse to communicate with police, according to Sir Hughe 
Orde, former President of ACPO, the policing response “will have to be different ... slightly 
more extreme” (Hill 2011). Thus, under a dialogue model, the resort to violent policing is not 
necessarily repressive; rather it is a rational response to non9rational forms of protest. Yet the 
police maintain the monopoly to decide which groups fall outside of the parameters of the 
dialogue model. Crude characterisations of protest groups, who often encompass a range of 
political perspectives and experiences, as radical, militant and ‘anti9police’, delegitimise their 
activities and exclude them from the possibilities of a more consensual policing response. In 
the case of the Barton Moss protesters, this framing enabled GMP to claim to ‘work hard to 
build relationships at the camp’ whilst at the same time deploying a heavily equipped, 
militarised policing unit to police an overwhelmingly peaceful protest. In a similar process to 
that described by Gordon in his critique of community policing, our analysis suggests that 
dialogue policing can have a  function, enabling the police to define protest 
groups as irrational and ‘uncooperative’ and therefore ripe for violent policing. 
Moreover, the assumed linear relationship between dialogue and coercion inherently 
excludes consideration of the 
 function of protest policing (Reiner 2010).  Under the 
dialogue model it is not the aim or target of a protest which dictates the policing response, but 
the organisational structure of the protest group and their willingness to speak to police. 
                                                
7 The ‘organisers’ of a planned march must give six days written notice to the police which specifies 
the date, time and proposed route, and the name and address of the organiser (Public Order Act 
1986, s.11).  
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Applying this de9politicised framework to the highly politicised sphere of anti9fracking 
protest would preclude consideration of, for example, the close relationship between 
government and the fracking industry (Short . 2015) and the political, social and 
economic context in which the anti9fracking movement has emerged (Jackson  2017). 
These are issues that policing researchers must engage with in order to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of protest policing in the current era. 
Finally, our analysis highlights the need to move beyond official public order policing 
discourses and consider the concrete experiences of the policed. In some cases, this will 
require researchers to maintain a critical distance from police forces in order to gain access to 
those groups who, due to their negative experiences of policing, may otherwise be reluctant 
to engage. In the context of a proliferation of police9academic partnerships in the UK (Goode 
and Lumsden 2016), it is vital that a space is maintained outside of these collaborations to 
enable researchers to engage with those groups most likely to bear the brunt of harmful and 
undemocratic policing practices.  
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Obstruction of the highway
Aggravated trespass
Breach of bail
Obstructing a police officer
Criminal damage
Section 4 Public Order Act 1986
Section 5 Public Order Act 1986
Breach of the peace
Threats to kill
Burglary




Failure to provide a specimen
Section 127 Communications Act 2003
Threats to cause damage
Possession of articles likely to cause criminal damage
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